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Abstract 
We examine inconsistencies in preference orderings (Alevy et al. 2011) using the Contingent 
valuation (CV) as well as the Inferred valuation (IV) method (Lusk and Norwood 2009a,b). 
We find that when moving in the context of a food market we only observe weak effects of 
inconsistencies. In addition, we find that the IV method is more susceptible to inconsistent 
preference orderings than the CV method. We also find that the IV method generates higher 
valuations than CV in case of consumers with high commitment costs but successfully 
mitigates social desirability bias in case of low commitment costs and high normative 
motivations.  
Key words:  willingness-to-pay (WTP), Contingent Valuation (CV), Inferred Valuation(IV), 
preference reversals 
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I. Introduction 
Eliciting people’s valuation for non-market goods has been central in the economics 
literature. The Contingent Valuation method (CV) is by far the most popular valuation 
method and a big bulk of the literature deals with refinements that (attempt to) address a 
number of documented biases. Recently, Lusk and Norwood (2009a,b) developed a new 
method for addressing the so-called social desirability bias, that is, the utility that people 
derive from stating a value to please the researcher or themselves. Respondents, in the 
presence of an interviewer may report socially desirable preferences, and thus misrepresent 
their “true” preferences, in order to either please the interviewer or to be consistent with 
social norms (Crowne and Marlowe 1960;Fisher 1993;Leggett et al. 2003;List et al. 
2004;Plant et al. 2003). The respondent wishes to provide the answer that is most "socially 
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acceptable" rather than speak his/her true feelings. Social desirability bias is intrinsic in CV 
studies.  
Lusk and Norwood (2009a) thought that instead of asking people what they are willing 
to pay, to ask them what they think another (average) person would pay1. This form of 
indirect questioning has been first proposed by Fisher (1993) which found that indirect 
questioning affected responses in questions with normative context but not in questions with 
personal motivation. This simple twist in the wording of the valuation question in Lusk and 
Norwood (2009b) generated (inferred) valuations that were close to real valuations (as 
compared to an experiment) and lower than hypothetical valuations (where social desirability 
is prevalent). Their results were also confirmed in Lusk and Norwood (2009a) but in this 
study the emphasis was put in exploring the role of normative motivations and the gap 
between the lab and the field. The authors showed that goods with normative dimensions are 
more prone to social desirability bias and thus the inferred valuation method is more effective 
in bridging the gap between the lab and the field valuations. The role of familiarity with the 
product and commitment costs were central in the analysis as well, since they found that 
people overstated their preferences for relatively familiar goods with normative attributes and 
understated their preferences for unfamiliar goods with low normative motivations. 
 Lusk and Norwood (2009a,b) coined the term Inferred Valuation (IV) to describe this 
type of indirect questioning in valuation studies. The aim of the IV method is not only to 
alleviate social desirability but also to moderate hypothetical bias. With the CV method 
people uncover preferences possibly including normative or moral considerations. On the 
contrary, with the IV method individuals are asked to predict how other people would behave 
and thus infer other’s people preferences that are ideally free from normative or moral 
                                                 
1 A similar concept was introduced in Cummings and Harrison’s (1992) “inference game”. 
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considerations. A natural question that follows is whether this prediction of preferences could 
result in more consistent and well defined preference orderings as compared to standard 
preference elicitation methods such as CV.  
The often cited strand of the literature that deals with non-consistent preference 
orderings is the preference reversal literature (see Seidl 2002 for a review). Broadly defined, 
any systematic change in preference orderings between normatively equivalent conditions 
can be called a preference-reversal (Slovic and Lichtenstein 1983). The preference reversals 
literature took off with the study of Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968) and the help of 
economists (Grether and Plott 1979) that demonstrated the robustness of the effect. The 
phenomenon is an empirical regularity such that a pricing task for lotteries reveals opposite 
preferences from a choice task made out of the lotteries. 
More recently, List (2002) (as well as Alevy et al., 2011)  demonstrated a different 
type of preference reversals; those that occur between joint and isolated evaluation modes (as 
opposed to different elicitation methods e.g., the pricing and choice task mentioned above). 
The evaluation mode (or “more is less”) preference reversals compare valuations of two 
related goods one of which clearly dominates the other, however the salience of the 
dominance is varied by having goods valued jointly and in isolation between subjects. 
Preference reversals occur when the dominated good is valued more highly in the isolated 
mode. List (2002) showed that preferences in the sports card market follow a “more is less” 
pattern: while in a joint evaluation mode a superior bundle of sports cards is consistently 
valued more highly than an inferior bundle, in an isolated mode the inferior bundle is valued 
more than the superior bundle of cards. He also showed that the effect is significantly 
attenuated for experienced subjects.  
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Hsee (1996) (as well as Hsee et al. 1999) proposed the evaluability hypothesis as an 
explanation for preference reversals between valuation modes. He suggested that preference 
reversals between joint and isolated evaluations occur because one of the attributes involved 
in the options is hard to evaluate independently and another attribute is relatively easy to 
evaluate independently. When these attributes are presented jointly, evaluation is facilitated. 
In fact, Hsee (1996) showed that when both attributes are hard to evaluate or easy to 
evaluate, preference reversals disappear.  
The consequences of preference reversals are significant since they refute a basic 
assumption of the rational choice theory, that preferences are consistent and stable. In 
contrast, they back up a behavioral decision theory which states that preferences are 
constructed on the spot when asked to form a particular judgment or to make a specific 
decision (Johnson et al. 2005;Lichtenstein and Slovic 2006;Payne et al. 1999;Slovic 1995). 
In this sense values are not merely uncovered when elicited, they are partly constructed at 
that time which implies labile preferences.  
 We designed two market based surveys with experimental treatments that allow us to 
specifically test for evaluation mode effects. As our valuation products, we chose private 
goods that have specific quality dimensions that were signaled through appropriate forms of 
food labeling. Most qualitative attributes of food products can be considered as “credence” 
characteristics since their quality cannot be recognised before the purchase of food but also 
sometimes neither after their purchase (Caswell and Modjuzska 1996;Darby and Karni 
1973). In our experiments we use “organic” (BIO) as well as “protected designation of 
origin” (PDO) food products as our superior quality products. The two experiments vary the 
saliency of the inferior quality product. In experiment 1, the superior quality product is either 
the BIO or the PDO; the inferior quality product is the conventional counterpart. In 
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experiment 2 we make the distinction between the inferior and superior quality product more 
salient by introducing a much more inferior product than in experiment 1. In addition, since 
the products used in experiment 1 are sold by their weight and volume, we introduced an 
additional product in experiment 2 that is sold by number of items. The purpose was to 
mimic List’s (2002)  design that used bundles of 10 and 13 sports cards. We also distinguish 
between experienced and inexperienced consumers in order to test whether market 
experience alleviates market anomalies.  
Thus, our experiments allow us to draw conclusions regarding: a) whether we observe 
inconsistent preference orderings when we move into the food market instead of the sports 
cards market b) whether or not evaluative predictions (inferred valuations) are better able to 
generate consistent preference orderings and c) the success of the IV method in mitigating 
social desirability bias. Section two presents our experimental design for Field Experiment 1 
and Field Experiment 2 while section three presents our hypotheses and results. We conclude 
at the last section. 
   
II. Experimental design 
The field experiments we designed are similar in concept to List’s (2002) and Alevy et 
al.’s (2011) experiments. However, we don’t require salient payment as in the original 
studies but we rather elicit hypothetical valuations. To the extent that hypothetical bias 
equally affects elicited valuations under different modes (isolated vs. joint), results should 
remain unaffected. In addition, since many CV studies are still conducted in hypothetical 
contexts2 results from this study are important in its own right. Therefore, several of the 
procedures for studying the implications of preference reversals across joint and isolated 
                                                 
2 Particularly true for environmental valuation studies where a market is difficult to establish. 
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valuation modes were similar to List’s (2002) and Alevy et al.’s (2011) experiments. 
Moreover, we alter List’s (2002) and Alevy et al.’s (2011) studies by replacing the sport 
cards market with the food market. The joint and isolated modes are evaluated across two 
elicitations methods namely the Contingent and Inferred valuation methods. More than one 
product is used for each valuation method to check for the robustness of our results.  
Data were collected in supermarkets from consumers while shopping. For half of the 
respondents valuations were elicited with the CV method and for the other half with the IV 
method. All valuation products were exhibited in photo stimuli (see Appendix C)3. Subjects 
were asked to report their willingness to pay for the good in the photo which was also 
described orally. In Field Experiment (FE) 1, the superior quality products were selected to 
be an “organic” (BIO) and a “protected designation of origin” (PDO) product. The inferior 
quality products were the conventional counterparts.  
In FE 2, we made the inferiority of the low quality products more salient by selecting 
products that we presumed would be even less desirable as compared to conventional 
products. For this reason we selected a seed-oil as the lower quality counterpart of the 
organic olive oil. Moreover, in order to more closely mimic List’s “sell-by-items” products 
(remember that 10 and 13-card bundles were offered in List (2002) and Alevy et al. (2011)), 
we used eggs as our second valuation product. Eggs can be sold in packs of 4, 6, 8 and 12 
eggs in super-markets or in customized packs in open-air food markets. 
 
Field Experiment 1: Design issues 
FE 1 was carried out in super markets located in city AAA (removed for peer review; 
to be adjusted upon publication). The experimenter approached each participant and invited 
                                                 
3 Appendix is provided online at https://sites.google.com/site/continfer/ . 
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him/her to participate voluntarily in an interview. If the respondent accepted the invitation, 
then s/he was allocated to one of the two evaluation modes (joint or isolated) and to one of 
the two elicitation methods (Contingent or Inferred valuation). If s/he was allocated to the 
isolated mode s/he was then further allocated to the “More” or “Less” product. This 3x2 
design is exhibited in Table 1. Each subject was only exposed to one of the treatments. In the 
joint mode subjects evaluated the products “Less”  and “More” simultaneously while in the 
isolated mode subjects evaluated either the “Less” or the “More” product but not both (i.e., 
three treatments: 1. Less & More-joint, 2. More-isolated, 3. Less-isolated). 
In each treatment, subjects were asked to evaluate two product categories (olive oil 
and apples). Order was alternated between subjects. The specific products used are exhibited 
in Table 2. Under the “More” modes, the superior quality products and the inferior 
counterpart were tied together and presented as a single product, thus we refer to the “More” 
product as a single product from now on. Standard socio-demographic data were also 
collected. Appendix C exhibits photo stimuli of the products shown to subjects.  
Our full factorial design is a 3x2x2 design4. In all, it took twelve subjects to complete 
the full factorial design one time. An example is given in Appendix B (Table B1). As 
exhibited, twelve subjects are required to participate in six treatments for two quality 
products (BIO and PDO). 
To sum up, in the “Isolated” evaluation modes subjects report their valuation either 
for a quality food product (LI for Less-Isolated) or for a quality food product tied with a 
smaller quantity of a conventional product (MI for More-Isolated) (see Table 2). In the 
“Joint” evaluation modes subjects report their valuation for both the quality food product (LJ 
                                                 
4 3 modes (Less & More-joint vs. More-isolated vs. Less-isolated) x 2 elicitation methods (contingent valuation 
vs. inferred valuation) x 2 quality products (BIO vs PDO). 
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for Less-Joint) as well as the quality product tied together with a conventional product (MJ 
for More-Joint). This design was ran for two quality products (BIO and PDO) and two 
elicitation methods (CV and IV). 
We should note that while the additional conventional food product is of lower 
quality than the PDO or BIO counterparts, in aggregate, the superior food quality product 
tied with the lower quality product have a greater market value than the superior food quality 
product itself. In the “Joint” evaluation mode, subjects evaluate the exact same products as in 
treatments LI and MI but this time side by side. 
No subject participated in more than one treatment. In addition, subjects evaluated the 
products using either CV or IV method; that is, no subject reported valuations with both 
methods. Third, each subject reported his/her valuation for one quality product, either a PDO 
product or a BIO product but not both. However, each subject reported valuations for two 
product categories i.e., olive oil and apples. Lastly, order of appearance of valuation 
questions (and products) was alternated in order between subjects. 
 
Field Experiment 1: The Survey 
WTP was elicited in an actual market place just before subjects enter a super-market. 
Interviews took place at various locations throughout the city, at stores of the three of the 
biggest food retailers in the country. The interviews were conducted by a single proctor (one 
of the authors) from Monday to Saturday, during morning and afternoon hours5. In total, 588 
completed questionnaires were collected. Table 3 depicts socio-demographic information 
from this sample. 
                                                 
5 Supermarkets are closed on Sundays throughout the country. 
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WTP was elicited using a payment card format in which subjects selected their most 
preferred choice among a series of sixteen price intervals (an example of the exact wording 
of the valuation questions are exhibited in Appendix G). We chose the payment card format 
instead of the single- or double-bounded approach because it exhibits more desirable 
properties than the other two (Reaves et al. 1999), less yeah saying at high bid amounts 
(Zhongmin et al. 2006) and more conservative estimates (Blaine et al. 2005). We designed 
two payment cards, one for each product i.e., olive oil and apples (see Appendix D). The 
payment card intervals were constructed using an exponential response scale to avoid range 
and centering bias with classical uniform payment cards (Rowe et al. 1996). Drichoutis et al. 
(2009) describe the procedure of constructing an exponential card in detail. The prices were 
selected so as to cover a wide range of market prices for conventional and BIO/PDO olive oil 
and apples, respectively.     
To distinguish between experienced and inexperienced people we asked subjects to 
self-rate their knowledge about either BIO or PDO products by asking them to indicate 
whether they agree with the statement “I know a lot about these products” on a 1 to 5 scale 
anchored by completely disagree and completely agree. Subjects that indicated to agree or 
completely agree with the statement where categorized as familiar with the products and thus 
experienced. 
To isolate normative motivations for BIO and PDO products, we asked subjects to 
indicate whether they agree with the statement “I should be looking to buy these products” 
on a 1 to 5 scale anchored by completely disagree and completely agree. Subjects that 
indicated to agree or completely agree with the statement where categorized as having strong 
normative motivations. 
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To proxy commitment costs we asked respondents to indicate how often they tend to 
buy BIO or PDO olive oil and apple products on a likert scale ranging from 1 to 5 (never, 
rarely, sometimes, often, always). Subjects that indicated buying often or always were 
classified as having low commitment costs. An assumption in our approach is that peoples’ 
previous purchases of goods in a product category are an appropriate proxy of commitment 
costs (similar to Lusk and Norwood 2009a). When people buy a product more often 
commitment costs are low. With the IV method subjects are asked to predict WTP for the 
“average consumer”. Therefore, if the person being asked thinks s/he is less price sensitive 
than the “average” shopper, this may result in stating a lower WTP in the IV than in the CV. 
For this reason price sensitivity was also recorded by having subjects answer a 5 point-likert 
question regarding how often they take price under consideration while grocery shopping. 
Answers were anchored by never and always and subjects that answered often or always 
were classified as price sensitive. 
  
Field Experiment 2: Design issues 
In FE 2 we followed the same experimental design of FE 1 (see Table 1) with some 
modifications for the valuation products. First, in order to make the “inferiority” of the low 
quality product more salient, we tied the organic olive oil with a seed oil (instead of a 
conventional oil). Seed oils are widely considered inferior quality products in the country as 
compared to olive oil.  
In addition, since the products used up to now are sold by their weight and volume, 
we introduced eggs (instead of apples) as the second valuation product. Eggs are sold by 
number of items. This allows us to more closely mimic List’s (2002) and Alevy et al.’s 
(2011) itemized-products (10 and 13 card bundles).  
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Therefore, in each treatment subjects were asked to evaluate two product categories 
(olive oil and eggs) in alternating order. The specific products used are exhibited in Table 4. 
The design in FE 2 closely mimics that of FE 1, with the exception that we only elicit 
valuations for BIO products and not PDO. Appendix C exhibits photo stimuli of the products 
shown to subjects. 
Our full factorial design is a 3x2 design6. In all, it took six subjects to complete the 
full factorial design one time. An example is given in Appendix B (Table B2). As exhibited, 
six subjects are required to participate in six treatments for the organic quality product. 
We should note that while the additional inferior food products are of lower quality 
than the BIO counterparts, in aggregate, the superior food quality product tied with the lower 
quality product have a greater market value than the superior food quality product itself. In 
the “Joint” evaluation mode, subjects evaluate the exact same products as in treatments LI 
and MI but this time side by side. 
No subject participated in more than one treatment. In addition, subjects evaluated the 
products using either CV or IV methods; that is, no subject reported valuations with both 
methods. Third, each subject reported valuations for two product categories i.e., olive oil and 
eggs. Lastly, order of appearance of valuation questions (and products) was completely 
randomized. 
 
Field Experiment 2: The Survey 
                                                 
6 3 modes (Less & More-joint vs. More-isolated vs. Less-isolated) x 2 elicitation methods (contingent valuation 
vs. inferred valuation). 
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WTP was elicited in an actual market place just before subjects enter a super-market. 
Interviews were conducted by the same proctor as in FE 1. In total, 192 completed 
questionnaires were collected. Table 3 depicts socio-demographic information from this  
sample. 
WTP was elicited using a similar payment card format to FE 1 (see Appendix D); 
payment card intervals were constructed using an exponential response scale. For olive oil 
the payment card was the same as in FE 1. The prices for eggs were selected so as to cover a 
wide range of market prices for conventional and organic eggs. 
 Similar questions to FE 1 were asked to distinguish between experienced and 
inexperienced subjects, to isolate normative motivations and proxy commitment costs. 
 
III. Hypotheses and Results 
Before proceeding with testing our hypotheses, insights can be gained by looking at some 
descriptive statistics of the WTP responses. Figures 1a,b and 2a,b show the distribution of 
responses over the 16-cell payment cards for olive oil in FE 1 and FE 2 respectively (similar 
figures are available in Appendix F for apples and eggs). If one closely observes the figures, 
it is apparent that for the “Joint” mode the distribution of responses for “More” is shifted 
more to the right, as compared with the distribution of responses for the “Less” mode. This 
indicates that WTP for the “More” product is greater than WTP for the “Less” product when 
products are evaluate jointly. Surprisingly, there is a similar pattern for the “Isolated” mode 
indicating the absence of a preference reversal. In addition, there is a clear shift of the 
distribution of responses to the right for the inferred valuation method as compared to the 
contingent valuation method; this is irrespective of the evaluation mode (Joint or Isolated, 
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More or Less). This indicates that valuations elicited with the inferred method appear to be 
greater than valuations elicited with the contingent method which refutes our basic 
assumption that inferred valuation mitigates social desirability bias. 
Before moving to the conditional analysis it is also important to investigate how the 
goods and subjects in both field experiments vary along key variables i.e., experience of the 
subject, normative motivations and commitment costs. Overall, results indicate that people 
felt more experienced with BIO products (mean=3.43) than PDO products (mean=2.91). p-
values from a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (WMN) test (p=0.0) indicate that there is a 
significant difference between degree of familiarity for the two products. In addition, subjects 
from FE 2 were slightly more experienced (mean=3.64) than subjects from FE 1 
(mean=3.43) with respect to BIO products. A WMN test (p=0.03) indicates that the 
difference is significant. 
Results also indicate that people felt higher normative motivations for BIO products 
(mean=2.81) than PDO products (mean=2.55). p-values from a WMN test (p=0.02) indicate 
that the difference is statistically significant. However, motivations for BIO products were 
not significantly different between field experiments (p=0.15 from WMN test). 
With respect to commitment costs, subjects indicated lower commitment costs for PDO 
olive oil (mean=2.11) than BIO olive oil (mean=1.69) and the difference is statistically 
significant according to a WMN test (p=0.0)7. However, for apples it is the exact opposite 
since subjects indicate lower commitment costs for BIO apples (mean=2.45) than PDO 
apples (mean=1.91) and the difference is statistically significant according to a WMN test 
(p=0.0). In addition, subjects in the first FE exhibited lower commitment costs for BIO olive 
                                                 
7 Note that a higher value in the scale indicates lower commitment costs and vice versa.  
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oil (mean=1.69) than the second FE (mean=1.33) and the difference is statistically significant 
(p=0.01 from WMN test). 
To formally test our hypothesis for preference reversals we adopt the definitions from 
Alevy et al.  (2011): 
Definition 1: A strong evaluation mode effect is observed when, in aggregate, 
preferences over the goods are: LI (Less, Isolated)MI (More, Isolated) and MJ (More, 
Joint)LJ (Less, Joint). 
Definition 2: A weak evaluation mode effect is observed when, in aggregate, preferences 
over the bundles are: LI ~ MI and MJ LJ. 
To test the effect of Inferred valuation on elicited valuations we can directly test whether 
WTP WTP Inferred Contingent . 
Table 5 summarizes the test forms that we adopt to test for preference reversals across 
the contingent and inferred valuation methods (Appendix E shows detailed derivations). 
Table E1 in the appendix shows the various linear combination forms that we use to test 
whether Inferred Contingent  (detailed derivations are exhibited in Appendix E as well). To 
test these hypotheses we estimate an interval regression model (to take into account the 
interval nature of the dependent variable) with robust clustered standard errors (to account 
for multiple responses by the same person in the Joint treatments). The empirical 
specification for FE 1 follows closely Alevy et al.’s (2011) specification:  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12
13 14 15 16
        
        
i i i i i i i i
i i i i i i ii
i i i i i i
WTP a a More a Joint a Infer a Exper a BIO a Norm a Commit
a PrSens a BIO Exper a BIO Norm a BIO Commit
a BIO PrSens a Infer Norm a Infer Commit a Infer P
       
      
       
17 18 19 20
21 22 23
24 25
        
        
        
i
i i i i i i i i
i i i i i i i
i i i i i i
rSens
a Infer Exper a More Joint a More Infer a More Exper
a Joint Infer a Joint Exper a More Joint Infer
a More Joint Exper a More Infer Exper a
       
      
       26
27 28        
i i i
i i i i i i
Joint Infer Exper
a More Joint Infer Exper a OrderQuest u
 
      b'DEM (1) 
 
 
16 
 
The DEM vector is a vector of demographic variables described in Table 3. The More, 
Joint, Infer, Exper, BIO, Norm, Commit and PrSens variables are dummies indicating 
conditions consistent with the variable name i.e., evaluation of the “More” product (vs. the 
“Less” product), evaluation in the “Joint” mode (vs. the “Isolated” mode), evaluation using 
the Inferred elicitation method (vs. Contingent valuation), experienced consumers (vs. 
inexperienced consumers), evaluation of organic products (vs. PDO), subject has high 
normative motivations for the product (vs. low normative motivations), subject has low 
commitment costs with the product (vs. high commitment costs) and subject is price sensitive 
(vs. no price sensitivity) respectively. The OrderQuest variable is a dummy controlling for 
the order of the valuation questions between product categories (olive oil and apples in FE 
1/olive oil and eggs in FE 2). 
A similar specification was adopted for FE 2 without the BIO and PrSens dummies and 
its interactions (only organic products were evaluated in FE 2). In addition, we didn’t ask the 
price sensitivity question in FE 2 because we didn’t find it playing a significant role in FE 1. 
To test our hypothesis, we use specification (1) to derive linear combinations of 
coefficients for hypothesis testing which are exhibited in detail in Appendix E. Since the 
focus is on testing the significance of linear combinations of coefficients, results from the 
raw interval regression output of equation (1) (and the respective equation for FE 2) are 
shown in Appendix A. 
 
Does CV and IV generate consistent preference orderings? 
To answer this question we test the hypotheses as described in Table 5. Notice that this 
test requires checking two hypotheses; a confirmation of inconsistent preference orderings 
requires that MI LI  and MJ LJ , in aggregate. Table 6a shows the results of these tests 
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from Field Experiment 1. The interaction terms associated with the Experience dummy 
allows us to further disentangle the effect of market experience on preference reversals. For 
each product (olive oil and apples) and method (contingent and inferred valuation) we first 
test whether the respective linear combination of coefficients from Table 5 is 0  
( 0 :  . 0H Linear Comb  ). The alternative hypothesis ( 1 :  . 0H Linear Comb  ) is consistent 
with MI LI . We then test whether the respective linear combination of coefficients is 0  
( 0 :  . 0H Linear Comb  ). The alternative hypothesis ( 1 :  . 0H Linear Comb  ) is consistent 
with MJ LJ . Note that any p-value exhibited in the table implies  1 pvalue  for the 
alternative hypothesis. 
First notice that the majority of linear combinations of coefficients are evaluated as 
positive which implies that MI LI  and MJ LJ . More specifically, most hypothesis 
involving 0H : WTP in MI mode > WTP in LI mode, cannot be rejected which suggests that 
average WTP in the MI mode is statistically significantly higher than average WTP in the LI 
mode8. However, there are some exceptions: medium sized p-values (or p-values >10% & < 
90%) indicate that we can neither reject  0H  nor 1H . In turn, this implies that ~MI LI . On 
the other hand, the hypothesis involving 0H : WTP in MJ mode < WTP in the LJ mode, is 
rejected in all but one cases, implying that MJ LJ .  Overall our findings indicate that we 
never observe strong evaluation mode effects as was the case in List (2002) (as well as Alevy 
et al., (2011)). Note that direct comparisons should be done in caution since, in contrast to 
those studies, we didn’t offer salient payments for eliciting valuations.  
                                                 
8 Note that a high p-value for 0H , implies a low p-value for 1H . Therefore, a p-value 90%  or 95%  for H0 
would be equivalent to a rejection of H1 at the 10% or 5% level respectively. 
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However, we do observe weak evaluation mode effects (that is, ~MI LI  & MJ LJ ). It 
is worth noting that weak preference reversals are observed only for the inferred valuation 
method and for experienced subjects. There are two conclusions coming out of these results. 
The first one is that market experience does not play a significant role in FE 1 for the 
contingent valuation method. It appears that both experienced and inexperienced consumers 
were not likely to commit a preference reversal in aggregate. The second conclusion is 
related to the fact that we find weak preference reversals for experienced subjects in the 
inferred elicitation method. This makes sense if we assume that experienced subjects are 
more likely to expect others to fall prey to social desirability bias and thus predict for others 
that, in aggregate, ~MI LI . On the other hand, inexperienced subjects may not expect other 
people to fall for social desirability bias and thus predict  MI LI . 
Data from Field Experiment 2 can help test the robustness of our results from FE 1. In 
FE 2 we made two significant changes: (a) the inferiority of the lower quality product was 
made more salient for olive oil by using seed oil instead of conventional olive oil and (b) 
eggs were used instead of apples to test whether the sell-by-items nature of the product 
(similar to List’s (2002) and Alevy et al.’s (2011) itemized card bundles) would make a 
difference. 
Results are exhibited in Table 6b. The pattern is somewhat different from FE 1 in that 
we observe more often weak preference reversals. First note that all p-values associated with 
the hypothesis 0H : WTP in MJ mode < WTP in the LJ mode, are lower than 5% indicating 
that the null hypothesis is highly rejected and that MJ LJ . However, p-values for 0H : 
WTP in MI mode > WTP in LI mode, are, in most cases, much lower than FE 1 and further 
away from conventional significance levels. In essence, this implies that average WTP in the 
MI mode is not statistically significantly different than WTP in the LI mode or that ~MI LI .  
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The conclusions we can draw from FE 2 are product specific. For valuations elicited 
with the CV method, we observe weak preference reversals for olive oil and no preference 
reversals for eggs and results are invariant for experienced/inexperienced subjects. These 
results may mean that making the inferiority of one of the products more salient significantly 
affected consumers, in aggregate, in generating inconsistent preference orderings (remember 
that in FE 1 we found no preference reversals for olive oil in the CV method). However, 
itemizing the product was not a contributing factor in generating inconsistent preference 
orderings.  
On the other hand, we observe weak preference reversals for valuations elicited with the 
IV method in all but one cases. Predictions elicited by experienced subjects for olive oil 
generated consistent preference orderings.  
Overall, while we can’t replicate strong evaluation mode effects as in List (2002) and 
Alevy et al. (2011) we do observe weak evaluation mode effects. It also appears that the IV 
method is more susceptible in generating inconsistent preference orderings than the CV 
method. Market experience didn’t make much difference in our results, as in the original 
studies.  
  
Does IV generate lower valuations than CV? 
The aim of the inferred valuation method, as originally used, was to mitigate social 
desirability bias that is encompassed in hypothetical bias. Lusk and Norwood (2009a,b) 
found that for goods with high normative motivations IV generated lower WTP valuations 
than hypothetical own valuations. Therefore, for goods for which people have high normative 
motivations we would expect average WTP from IV to be lower than average WTP from 
CV: Inferred Contingent . On the other hand, when subjects have low normative 
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motivations for the good we would expect Inferred Contingent  (see also Figure 1 in Lusk 
and Norwood, 2009a). Table E1 in the appendix indicates linear combinations of coefficients 
that are required to test our hypothesis, by evaluation mode, subjects experience, normative 
motivations, commitment costs and price sensitivity. Results of these one-sided tests are 
displayed in tables 7a,b for FE 1 and tables 7c,d for FE 2. A positive value indicates that 
Inferred Contingent  while a negative value indicates the exact opposite.  
Visual inspection of Tables 7 indicates that the linear combination of coefficients often 
results in a positive value indicating that WTP from the IV method is greater than WTP from 
the CV method. However, Table 7 also exhibits negative values indicating that average WTP 
from IV is lower than average WTP from CV. This is most often the case for inexperienced 
subjects and/or with high normative motivations and/or low commitment costs. P-values can 
help us decide whether the observed differences are statistically significant given the 
dispersions. The hypothesis being tested is 0 : 0H Inferred Contingent  , therefore a high 
p-value ( 90% ) indicates that Inferred Contingent , a low p-value ( 10% ) indicates 
rejection of the null while an intermediate-sized p-vlaue (10% 90%p value   ) indicates 
that WTP Inferred=WTP Contingent.  
Tables 7a,b (corresponding to FE 1) indicate that for high commitment costs, the IV 
method generates WTP values that are statistically significantly greater than the CV method. 
This finding applies equally to experienced and inexperienced subjects. However, for 
inexperienced subjects in the majority of cases for which commitment costs are low, WTP 
values elicited with the IV method are statistically significantly lower than the CV method. 
Moreover, this finding is often the case when normative motivations are high rather than low. 
In many other cases, for example when commitment costs are low and normative motivations 
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are low, values elicited with IV are statistically indistinguishable than values elicited with 
CV. 
These findings are further reinforced in FE 2 but we also find some notable differences. 
For olive oil, results show that for subjects with low commitment costs, in aggregate, IV 
generates valuations lower than CV, especially when normative motivations are high as well. 
On the other hand, in case of  low normative motivations and high commitment costs we find 
that WTP values from IV are higher than CV. This finding applies equally to experienced 
and inexperienced subjects. For eggs we never find that IV generates values statistically 
significantly lower than CV, which may be an indication that the nature of the product (e.g., 
sold by number of items vs. sold by volume) also has an effect on subjects’ valuations. 
In sum, we partially reconfirm Lusk and Norwood’s (2009a,b) results that found that 
for goods with high normative motivations we should expect IV to generate lower valuations 
than CV. However, their model did not predict that for high commitment costs and low 
normative motivations there could be a case that IV generates higher valuations that CV. 
This calls for further scrutiny of the IV method with more diverse samples and goods. 
 
IV. Conclusions 
 
We started this article with a series of questions which we are now ready to answer. In 
both field experiments we could not replicate strong evaluation mode effects as in the 
original studies that studied preference reversals (List, 2002; Alevy et al. 2011). In our 
experiments, we only observe weak evaluation mode effects. It also appears that the IV 
method is slightly more susceptible in generating inconsistent preference orderings than the 
CV method while market experience didn’t make a difference in our results.  
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Our second aim was to reexamine the effectiveness of the IV method in mitigating 
social desirability bias. Inferred valuation consistently generated higher valuations than 
Contingent valuation in the case where the commitment cost was high. On the other hand, 
with low commitment cots and high normative motivations, inferred valuation successfully 
mitigated social desirability by generating lower valuations than CV. To the extent that 
hypothetical bias and social desirability bias was present in our study (and we have no reason 
to believe that our study would differ from other hypothetical studies) this is a sign that IV 
will work for certain products and consumers.  
It will take time and more studies of this kind to answer the question for which 
contexts, products and samples the inferred valuation method remains a promising method 
for mitigating biases. All in all, we believe that this topic could indeed be a prime area for 
future economic research. 
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Table 1. Field experiments - experimental design 
  Elicitation method 
Evaluation modes Products (Less or More) 
Contingent 
valuation 
(CV) 
Inferred 
valuation 
(IV) 
Isolated Less Isolated (LI) LI-CV LI-IV More Isolated (MI) MI-CV MI-IV 
Joint Less Joint (LJ) LJ-CV LJ-IV More Joint (MJ) MJ-CV MJ-IV 
 
 
Table 2. Products by evaluation mode (FE 1) 
  Evaluation modes 
  Less Isolated More Isolated 
Less Joint 
& 
More Joint 
Olive oil 
Product 1 BIO olive oil (750 ml)  
BIO olive oil 
(750 ml) 
Product 2  
BIO olive oil 
(750 ml) 
+ 
Conventional olive oil 
(250 ml) 
BIO olive oil 
(750 ml) 
+ 
Conventional olive oil 
(250 ml) 
Product 3 PDO olive oil (750 ml)  
PDO olive oil 
(750 ml) 
Product 4  
PDO olive oil 
(750 ml) 
+ 
Conventional olive oil 
(250 ml) 
PDO olive oil 
(750 ml) 
+ 
Conventional olive oil 
(250 ml) 
Apples 
Product 5 BIO apples (1 Kgr)  
BIO apples 
(1 Kgr) 
Product 6  
BIO apples 
(1 Kgr) 
+ 
Conventional apples 
(250 gr) 
BIO apples 
(1 Kgr) 
+ 
Conventional apples 
(250 gr) 
Product 7 PDO apples (1 Kgr)  
PDO apples 
(1 Kgr) 
Product 8  
PDO apples 
(1 Kgr ) 
+ 
Conventional apples 
(250 gr) 
PDO apples 
(1 Kgr) 
+ 
Conventional apples 
(250 gr) 
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Table 3. Variable description  
Variables Variable description 
Field 
experiment 
1 
Field 
experiment 
2 
Mean 
(Std.Dev.) 
Mean 
(Std.Dev.) 
Ιncome1 * Dummy, Household’s economic position is bad or very bad=1 
0.049 
(0.217) 
0.047 
(0.212) 
Ιncome2 Dummy, Household’s economic position is below average=1 
0.066 
(0.249) 
0.073 
(0.261) 
Ιncome3 Dummy, Household’s economic position is average=1 
0.505 
(0.500) 
0.531 
(0.500) 
Ιncome4 Dummy, Household’s economic position is above average=1 
0.197 
(0.398) 
0.187 
(0.391) 
Ιncome5 Dummy, Household’s economic position is good=1 
0.143 
(0.350) 
0.130 
(0.337) 
Ιncome6 Dummy, Household’s economic position is very good=1 
0.039 
(0.194) 
0.031 
(0.174) 
Educ1 * 
Dummy, Education level is up to High 
school=1 
0.059 
(0.237) 
0.062 
(0.243) 
Educ2 
Dummy, Education level is High school 
graduate=1 
0.354 
(0.479) 
0.380 
(0.487) 
Educ3 
Dummy, Education level is University 
graduate=1 
0.471 
(0.499) 
0.474 
(0.500) 
Educ4 Dummy, Education level is Postgraduate=1 
0.115 
(0.320) 
0.083 
(0.277) 
Age Subject’s age 45.094 (12.440) 
44.328 
(12.750) 
Child Dummy, Subject has underage children in household=1 
0.415 
(0.493) 
0.271 
(0.445) 
HSize Household size 2.901 (1.381) 
3.094 
(1.270) 
Gender Dummy, Male=1 0.349 (0.477) 
0.266 
(0.443) 
Exper Dummy, 1=Experienced subject 0.423 (0.495) 
0.547 
(0.499) 
Norm Dummy, 1=Strong normative motivation 0.325 (0.469) 
0.318 
(0.467) 
PrSens Dummy, 1=Subject is price sensitive 0.811 (0.392) - 
Commit 
Dummy, 1=Subject has low commitment cost 
in buying olive oil 
0.207 
(0.406) 
0.057 
(0.233) 
Dummy, 1=Subject has low commitment cost 
in buying apples 
0.252 
(0.434) - 
Dummy, 1=Subject has low commitment cost 
in buying eggs - 
0.213 
(0.411) 
* Variables with an asterisk were omitted from the econometric models  
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Table 4. Products by evaluation mode (FE 2) 
  Treatments per evaluation modes  
  Less Isolated More Isolated 
       Less Joint 
& 
More Joint  
Olive oil 
Product 1 BIO olive oil 
(750 ml)  
BIO olive oil 
(750 ml) 
Product 2  
BIO olive oil 
(750 ml) 
+ 
Seed oil 
(250 ml) 
BIO olive oil 
(750 ml) 
+ 
Seed oil 
(250 ml) 
Eggs 
Product 3 BIO eggs 
(8 eggs)  
BIO eggs 
(8 items) 
Product 4  
BIO eggs 
(8 eggs) 
+ 
Conventional eggs 
(3 eggs) 
BIO eggs 
(8 eggs) 
+ 
Conventional eggs 
(3 eggs) 
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Table 5. Linear combinations of coefficients for hypothesis testing 
Hypothesis 
Tested Test form 
Elicitation 
method or 
valuation 
mode 
Experienceda Inexperienceda 
Preference 
reversals 
MI LI  
and 
MJ LJ  
Contingent
0More More Exper    & 
0
More More Joint More Exper
More Joint Exper
   
     
0More   & 
0More More Joint    
Inferred 
0
More More Infer More Exper
More Infer Exper
   
          & 
0
More More Joint More Infer More Exper
More Joint Infer More Joint Exper
More Infer Exper More Joint Infer Exper
     
     
       
 
0More More Infer    & 
0
More More Infer More Joint
More Joint Infer
   
   
 
a The expressions involved in these columns concern coefficients which are named of their respective dummies. 
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Table 6a. Hypothesis tests for preference reversals in Field Experiment 1 
 
  Olive oil Apples 
Experienced Inexperienced Experienced Inexperienced 
 (p-value) 
CV 
Ho : WTP in MI mode > 
WTP in the LI mode 
(isolated) 
1.372  
(0.998) 
1.504 
(0.999) 
0.341  
(0.990) 
0.545  
(0.999) 
Ho : WTP in MJ mode < 
WTP in the LJ mode 
(joint) 
0.571 
(0.051) 
1.081  
(0.000) 
0.080  
(0.262) 
0.467  
(0.000) 
IV 
Ho : WTP in MI mode > 
WTP in the LI mode 
(isolated) 
0.787  
(0.868) 
1.400 
 (0.999) 
-0.041 
(0.432) 
0.630  
(0.999) 
Ho : WTP in MJ mode < 
WTP in the LJ mode 
(joint) 
1.572 
(0.000) 
1.112  
(0.000) 
0.314  
(0.001) 
0.319  
(0.000) 
 
Table 6b. Hypothesis tests for preference reversals in Field Experiment 2 
  Olive oil Eggs 
Experienced Inexperienced Experienced Inexperienced 
 (p-value) 
CV 
Ho : WTP in MI mode > 
WTP in the LI mode 
(isolated) 
0.075  
(0.521) 
0.704  
(0.718) 
1.045  
(0.958) 
1.081  
(0.934) 
Ho : WTP in MJ mode < 
WTP in the LJ mode 
(joint) 
0.526 
(0.016) 
0.614  
(0.005) 
0.318  
(0.020) 
0.341  
(0.000) 
IV 
Ho : WTP in MI mode > 
WTP in the LI mode 
(isolated) 
2.073  
(0.983) 
-0.160  
(0.449) 
0.241  
(0.644) 
-0.281  
(0.343) 
Ho : WTP in MJ mode < 
WTP in the LJ mode 
(joint) 
0.930 
(0.000) 
1.300  
(0.000) 
0.616  
(0.000) 
0.905  
(0.000) 
 
 
 
31 
 
Table 7a. Hypothesis test for whether IV generates lower valuations than CVa,b 
Olive oil – Field Experiment 1 
Panel A: Experienced subjects 
Evaluat
ion 
mode 
  Price sensitive Price insensitive 
More 
Joint 
  Normative motivations 
  Low High Low High 
Commitment
cost 
High 2.422 (0.998) 2.258 (0.995) 2.430 (0.991) 2.266 (0.985) 
Low 0.596 (0.743) -1.394 (0.693) 0.604 (0.716) 0.440 (0.668) 
Less 
Joint 
  Normative motivations 
  Low High Low High 
Commitment 
cost 
High 1.420 (0.977) 1.256 (0.959) 1.428 (0.943) 1.264 (0.915) 
Low -0.406 (0.306) -0.570 (0.215) -0.397 (0.337) -0.562 (0.264) 
More 
Isolated 
  Normative motivations 
  Low High Low High 
Commitment 
cost 
High 1.551 (0.972) 1.387 (0.953) 1.560 (0.955) 1.396 (0.931) 
Low -0.274 (0.385) -0.439 (0.308) -0.266 (0.396) -0.430 (0.326) 
Less 
Isolated 
  Normative motivations 
  Low High Low High 
Commitment 
cost 
High 2.136 (0.998) 1.971 (0.997) 2.144 (0.993) 1.980 (0.990) 
Low 0.310 (0.638) 0.146 (0.574) 0.318 (0.630) 0.154 (0.570) 
Panel B: Inexperienced subjects 
   Price sensitive Price insensitive 
   Normative motivations 
   Low High Low High 
More 
Joint 
Commitment 
cost 
High 1.231 (0.980) 1.067 (0.940) 1.239 (0.939) 1.075 (0.890) 
Low -0.595 (0.182) -0.759 (0.117) -0.587 (0.235) -0.751 (0.176) 
   Normative motivations 
   Low High Low High 
Less 
Joint 
Commitment 
cost 
High 1.200 (0.994) 1.036 (0.960) 1.209 (0.955) 1.044 (0.903) 
Low -0.626 (0.132) -0.790 (0.076) -0.617 (0.200) -0.781 (0.144) 
   Normative motivations 
   Low High Low High 
More 
Isolated 
Commitment 
cost 
High 1.455 (0.999) 1.291 (0.985) 1.463 (0.985) 1.299 (0.949) 
Low -0.371 (0.265) -0.535 (0.192) -0.363 (0.315) -0.527 (0.250) 
   Normative motivations 
   Low High Low High 
Less 
Isolated 
Commitment 
cost 
High 1.558 (0.999) 1.394 (0.990) 1.567 (0.987) 1.403 (0.957) 
Low -0.267 (0.328) -0.431 (0.244) -0.259 (0.369) -0.423 (0.299) 
a The hypothesis being tested is 0 : 0H Inferred Contingent   . A rejection of the null is equivalent to 
1 :H Inferred Contingent . Table E1 in the appendix shows the exact linear combination of coefficients being 
tested in each case. 
b p-values in parenthesis 
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Table 7b. Hypothesis testing whether IV generates lower valuations than CVa,b 
Apples – Field Experiment 1 
Panel A: Experienced subjects 
Evaluat
ion 
mode 
  Price sensitive Price insensitive 
More 
Joint 
  Normative motivations  
  Low High Low High 
Commitment 
cost 
High 0.813 (0.994) 0.527 (0.959) 0.850 (0.987) 0.564 (0.937) 
Low 0.499 (0.923) -0.101 (0.760) 0.536 (0.906) 0.250 (0.749) 
Less 
Joint 
  Normative motivations 
  Low High Low High 
Commitment 
cost 
High 0.578 (0.980) 0.292 (0.864) 0.615 (0.965) 0.329 (0.838) 
Low 0.264 (0.801) -0.022 (0.467) 0.301 (0.794) 0.015 (0.518) 
More 
Isolated 
  Normative motivations 
  Low High Low High 
Commitment 
cost 
High 0.642 (0.991) 0.357 (0.909) 0.680 (0.983) 0.394 (0.888) 
Low 0.328 (0.857) 0.043 (0.562) 0.366 (0.849) 0.080 (0.595) 
Less 
Isolated 
  Normative motivations 
  Low High Low High 
Commitment 
cost 
High 1.025 (0.999) 0.739 (0.999) 1.062 (0.999) 0.777 (0.996) 
Low 0.711 (0.996) 0.425 (0.962) 0.748 (0.992) 0.463 (0.942) 
Panel B: Inexperienced subjects 
   Price sensitive Price insensitive 
   Normative motivations  
   Low High Low High 
More 
Joint 
Commitment 
cost 
High -0.001 (0.498) -0.287 (0.093) 0.036 (0.556) -0.249 (0.195) 
Low -0.315 (0.096) -0.601 (0.004) -0.278 (0.180) -0.563 (0.031) 
   Normative motivations 
   Low High Low High 
Less 
Joint 
Commitment 
cost 
High 0.148 (0.830) -0.138 (0.233) 0.185 (0.784) -0.100 (0.354) 
Low -0.166 (0.221) -0.452 (0.013) -0.129 (0.325) -0.414 (0.072) 
   Normative motivations 
   Low High Low High 
More 
Isolated 
Commitment 
cost 
High 0.424 (0.997) 0.139 (0.749) 0.462 (0.970) 0.176 (0.727) 
Low 0.111 (0.692) -0.175 (0.218) 0.148 (0.691) -0.138 (0.328) 
   Normative motivations 
   Low High Low High 
Less 
Isolated 
Commitment 
cost 
High 0.340 (0.993) 0.054 (0.613) 0.378 (0.945) 0.092 (0.629) 
Low 0.026 (0.551) -0.259 (0.100) 0.064 (0.588) -0.222 (0.224) 
a The hypothesis tested is 0 : 0H Inferred Contingent   . A rejection of the null is equivalent to 
1 :H Inferred Contingent . Table E1 in the appendix shows the exact linear combination of coefficients being 
tested in each case. 
b p-values in parenthesis 
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Table 7c. Hypothesis testing whether IV generates lower valuations than CVa,b 
 
Olive oil – Field Experiment 2 
Panel A: Experienced subjects 
Evaluation 
mode    
More 
Joint 
  Normative motivations 
  Low High 
Commitment 
cost 
High 5.071 (0.999) 2.949 (0.974) 
Low 1.431 (0.685) -0.690 (0.396) 
Less 
Joint 
   
  Low High 
Commitment 
cost 
High 4.667 (0.999) 2.545 (0.964) 
Low 1.028 (0.639) -1.094 (0.333) 
More 
Isolated 
   
  Low High 
Commitment 
cost 
High 3.881 (0.996) 1.760 (0.864) 
Low 0.242 (0.540) -1.880 (0.179) 
Less 
Isolated 
   
  Low High 
Commitment 
cost 
High 1.883 (0.945) -0.239 (0.427) 
Low -1.756 (0.264) -3.878 (0.058) 
Panel B: Inexperienced subjects
More 
Joint 
  Normative motivations 
  Low High 
Commitment 
cost 
High 4.597 (0.999) 2.475 (0.949) 
Low 0.957 (0.624) -1.164 (0.334) 
Less 
Joint 
   
  Low High 
Commitment 
cost 
High 3.911 (0.998) 1.789 (0.892) 
Low 0.271 (0.537) -1.850 (0.239) 
More 
Isolated 
   
  Low High 
Commitment 
cost 
High 1.619 (0.886) -0.502 (0.383) 
Low -2.020 (0.242) -4.142 (0.064) 
Less 
Isolated 
   
  Low High 
Commitment 
cost 
High 2.483 (0.988) 0.362 (0.598) 
Low -1.156 (0.335) -3.278 (0.097) 
a The hypothesis tested is 0 : 0H Inferred Contingent   . A rejection of the null is equivalent to 
1 :H Inferred Contingent . Table E1 in the appendix shows the exact linear combination of coefficients being 
tested in each case. 
b p-values in parenthesis 
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Table 7d. Hypothesis testing whether IV generates lower valuations than CVa,b 
Eggs – Field Experiment 2 
Panel A: Experienced subjects 
Evaluation 
mode    
More 
Joint 
  Normative motivations 
  Low High 
Commitment 
cost 
High 0.778 (0.864) 0.192 (0.596) 
Low 0.792 (0.795) 0.206 (0.625) 
Less 
Joint 
   
  Low High 
Commitment 
cost 
High 0.480 (0.762) -0.106 (0.446) 
Low 0.494 (0.704) -0.092 (0.440) 
More 
Isolated 
   
  Low High 
Commitment 
cost 
High 0.828 (0.873) 0.242 (0.601) 
Low 0.842 (0.789) 0.256 (0.610) 
Less 
Isolated 
   
  Low High 
Commitment 
cost 
High 1.632 (0.991) 1.046 (0.859) 
Low 1.646 (0.950) 1.060 (0.876) 
Panel B: Inexperienced subjects
More 
Joint 
  Normative motivations 
  Low High 
Commitment 
cost 
High 1.727 (0.961) 1.141 (0.825) 
Low 1.740 (0.954) 1.154 (0.881) 
Less 
Joint 
   
  Low High 
Commitment 
cost 
High 1.162 (0.899) 0.576 (0.692) 
Low 1.176 (0.885) 0.590 (0.743) 
More 
Isolated 
   
  Low High 
Commitment 
cost 
High 0.250 (0.665) -0.336 (0.372) 
Low 0.264 (0.612) -0.322 (0.369) 
Less 
Isolated 
   
  Low High 
Commitment 
cost 
High 1.612 (0.983) 1.026 (0.831) 
Low 1.626 (0.936) 1.040 (0.843) 
a The hypothesis tested is 0 : 0H Inferred Contingent   . A rejection of the null is equivalent to 
1 :H Inferred Contingent . Table E1 in the appendix shows the exact linear combination of coefficients being 
tested in each case. 
b p-values in parenthesis 
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Figure 1a. Distribution of responses by payment card cells for olive oil in FE 1(Contingent valuation) 
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Figure 1b. Distribution of responses by payment card cells for olive oil in FE 1 (Inferred valuation) 
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Figure 2a. Distribution of responses by payment card cells for olive oil  in FE 2 (Contingent valuation) 
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Figure 2b. Distribution of responses by payment card cells for olive oil  in FE 2 (Inferred valuation) 
 
 
